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Does multinational firm take advantage of arbitrage opportunities when heterogeneity in transfer 
pricing regulations exist between home and host country?  Using data on U.S. based 
multinational firms’ reinvestment earnings abroad as a proxy for FDI activity, provided by the 
BEA Survey of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad and the Balance of Payments Survey, we analyze 
the effect of transfer pricing regulation of multination firm FDI’s decision.  The analysis results 
provide no empirical evidence that differences in transfer pricing regulation between home and 
host country affect FDI activity by U.S. based multinational firms.  Host country’s specific 
characteristics such as market size, distant from the U.S., trade openness, as well as tax rates 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1994, the United States is the only country to have specific law regulating how transfer 
prices should be set for intra-firm trades.  Since then there has been a proliferation in transfer 
pricing regulations around the world modeled after the U.S. transfer pricing regulation.  The 
reasons for this proliferation are (1) countries do not want to be at a disadvantage in taxing 
multinational firms and (2) there is a population perception that transfer pricing is being used by 
multinational firm as mean for tax avoidance and tax evasion (Sheppard, 2010).  Bloomberg 
(2010) shows how Google saves $1 billion in taxes by shifting intellectual properties to Ireland 
and Bermuda to take advantage of the differences in tax rates through the use of transfer prices.  
Furthermore, in 2005, GlaxoSmithKline, a major multinational pharmaceutical firm agreed to 
pay the U.S. Internal Revenue Service $3.4 billion for backed taxes for misused of transfer 
pricing to shift taxable income from its U.S subsidiary to the parent firm in the U.K. from 1995 
through 2003.   
Governments are paying more attention to multinational firms transfer pricing practices 
as well as coming up with effective laws and regulations to curtail tax avoidance through the use 
of transfer prices.  However, our understanding of the effects of transfer pricing regulation on 
multinational firm is limited, especially its effect on foreign direct investment by multinational 
firm.   
Using the data on U.S. based multinational firm’s reinvestment earnings abroad we 
evaluates the effects of transfer pricing on multinational firm foreign direct investment’s 
decision.  Both theoretical and empirical evidences suggested that multinational firm whose has 
multiple divisions located in different tax jurisdictions, has the incentive to shift taxable income 
from high tax jurisdiction to low tax jurisdiction through the use of transfer prices (Horst, 1971, 
1973; Eden, 1998).1  By shifting taxable income from high tax jurisdiction to low tax jurisdiction 
multinational firm reduces its effective tax rate on its global income (Eden, 1998).  Therefore, it 
is reasonable to expect that host country with relatively weak transfer pricing regulation attracts 
more FDI from multinational firms.  Because of host country’s weak transfer pricing regulation, 
multinational firm would under-invoice its imports to host country and/or over-invoice its 
exports to home country.  On the other hand, if both countries (home and host) are homogenous 
in term of their transfer pricing regulation then FDI should not be affected since tax arbitrage 
opportunities disappeared (i.e. transfer prices have to be set at arm lengths). 
In our paper, weak transfer pricing regulation is defined as having no transfer pricing 
regulation or guideline in the country’s tax codes.  However we use two measurements for strong 
regulation, (1) require transfer prices be set at arm-length but does not require contemporaneous 
documentation and (2) requires both the arm-length principles and the contemporaneous 
documentation.   
  In the next section, we will discuss the relevant literature on transfer pricing and its 
regulation in detail. 
TRANSFER PRICING BACKGROUND 
Transfer prices are prices established within a business enterprise (e.g., a divisionalized firm, 
a corporation, a holding company, etc.) for goods, services, intellectual property, and/or credit 
transferred between units. Transfer pricing has been a topic of growing academic study in economics 
since the pioneering work of Hirschleifer (1956, 1957), Gould (1964), and Horst (1971, 1973).  
Theoretical research on tax-motivated transfer pricing includes Eden (1998), Horst (1971), and 
                                                 
1 Eden (1998) provides both theoretical and real-world evidence of profit shifting by multinational firms through the use of 
transfer pricing. 
Samuelson (1982).  They examine the effect of different tax rates across countries on prices that 
multinationals firms set for their intra-firm trades.  They show that transfer prices can be served as a 
tool for multinational firm to shift taxable income from subsidiaries located in high tax countries to 
subsidiaries in low-tax countries.   
There is also a large empirical literature confirming income shifting by multinational 
firms through transfer pricing (Grubert and Mutti, 1991; Collins et al., 1998; Desai et al., 2006; 
Clausing, 2003; Bernard et at., 2006).  Grubert and Mutti (1991), Collins et al. (1998), and Desai 
et al. (2006) use aggregate, industry-level prices and survey data collected by the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis to estimate the magnitude of income shifting to lower-tax countries.  Others 
(e.g. Bernard et al., 2006; Clausing, 2003) use a more direct approach by constructing data on 
export/import prices to estimate the magnitude of tax-motivated transfer prices.   Their results 
support the tax-motivated transfer pricing manipulation by multinational firms, suggesting that 
multinational firms shift incomes from a high tax country to a low tax country through the use of 
transfer pricing.   
TRANSFER PRICING REGULATION 
The U.S. transfer pricing regulation was introduced for primarily two reasons.  The first 
was the IRS experience during transfer pricing audits (Lowell et al., 1994).  The IRS found that 
most multinational firms had no documentations to support their transfer prices and thus 
increases time and costs for the IRS.  As a result, having transfer pricing regulation in the tax 
codes would improves compliance by multinational firms and reduce service times and costs for 
the IRS.  More importantly, it is a well-known perception that multinational firms were 
underpaying U.S. taxes due to transfer price manipulation.   
Transfer price manipulation takes place when there are differences in corporate income 
tax rates, tariffs, foreign exchange restrictions, and political risk across countries.  If corporate 
income taxes between the home and host country are different then multinational firms can either 
over (under) invoice their transfer prices to shift taxable income to low tax country.   If the host 
country levies tariffs on imports then this also provides an incentive for multinational firms to 
under-invoice their imports in order to save on duties paid.   A third motivation for transfer 
pricing arbitrage exists when host country has foreign currency exchange restrictions, thus by 
over(under) invoice of inbound(outbound) transfers enable the multinational firm to move 
incomes out of the host country that would not be permissible with currency controls (Chow and 
Hung, 1997).  And finally, if the multinational firm fears instability in the host country’s political 
environment then capital flight can be accomplished through the use of transfer prices (Lessard 
and Williamson, 1984). 
To restrict the possibility of transfer pricing manipulation by multinational firms, 
governments around the world are increasing their efforts to pass transfer pricing regulation into 
their tax codes.  In 1994, the United States incorporated Section 482 into its tax codes, which 
authorizes the IRS to impose penalty on firms who evade or avoid taxes through the use of 
transfer prices.  Section 482 requires the transfer prices charged within an integrated enterprise 
be consistent with the arm’s length principle2.  This principle requires the transfer price of a good 
or service in an intra-firm trade is equal to the price of two unrelated firms negotiating at arm’s 
length for the same or a similar good or service.   Section 482 also requires multinational firm 
based in the U.S. to have contemporaneous documentation on their transfer pricing practices and 
                                                 
2 Section 482 of the I.R.S tax code provide a much elaborate details than mentioned in this paper, however the main points of 
Section 482 is presented here.   
to provide this documentation to the I.R.S upon request.  If there is evidence of transfer pricing 
manipulation or noncompliance on the contemporaneous documentation requirement then the 
IRS is authorized to impose a penalty as well as make adjustments on the actual transfer prices.   
The penalty raises the effective corporate tax rate from 35% to 48% depending on the level of 
manipulation.   
Following the U.S. footsteps, in 1995 the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) developed a set of transfer pricing guidelines for multinational firms 
regulating their transfer pricing practices similar to Section 482 of the U.S. tax code.  In 1994, 
the U.S. was the only major country to have specific law in its tax codes but now more than 40 
countries around the world have adopted a highly technical and sophisticated transfer pricing 
regulation similar to the U.S. Section 482 and the OECD’s transfer pricing guidelines in their tax 
codes (Eden, 2009).   Consequently, there has been considerable evidence of international 
homogeneity in transfer pricing policies across countries.  
 
RELATED LITERATURE REVIEW 
While the empirical literature on the determinants of FDI is large, however none focus on 
the relationship between FDI and transfer pricing regulation3.   The empirical literature on FDI 
and regulation focuses almost exclusively on market size (Markusen and Venables, 1999), skill 
differences between the home and host country (Zhang and Markusen, 1999), role of natural 
resources, international institutions (Wheeler and Mody, 1992; Hines, 1995; Wei, 2000a, 200b), 
Trade Protection (Grubert and Mutti, 1991; Kogut and Chang, 1996; Blonigen, 1997), 
environmental regulation (Xing and Kolstad, 2002; Dean, Lovely, and Wang, 2009; List and Co, 
                                                 
3 Blonigen (2005) provides an excellent review  on the empirical literature on FDI determinants. 
2000; Hanna, 2004), and intellectual property rights protection (Ferrantino, 1993; Smarzynska, 
2002; Fink and Maskus, 2005; Lee and Mansfield, 1996; Smith, 1999, 2001).   
Hanna (2004) and Xing and Kolstad (2002) provide empirical evidence to support the 
theory that environmental regulation causes firm to substitute foreign for domestic production.  
Their results indicate that host countries with weak environmental regulations attract FDI from 
U.S. based multinationals in heavy polluting sectors.  However, Dean et al (2009) finds that 
weak environmental regulation in China does not attract equity joint ventures from non-
ethnically Chinese countries, especially high income countries. 
The empirical results examining the impact of intellectual property rights protection 
provide conflicting results.  Ferrantino (1993) finds that strong domestic patent protection 
increases the flows of payments and receipts for intellectual property.  Smarzynska’s (2002) 
results show that weak intellectual property rights protection deters investors from investing in 
sectors relying heavily on intellectual property rights protection.  On the other hand, Braga and 
Fink (2005) finds no effect of intellectual property rights protection on trade flows for high 
technology sectors.   
To the best of our knowledge this is the first study that empirically tests the effect of 
transfer pricing regulation on multinational firms’ FDI decisions.  A similar paper by Eden et al., 
(2005) uses an event study to assess the impact of U.S. transfer pricing penalties on Japanese 
multinationals.   Their results show that with the presence of transfer pricing penalties the market 
value of Japanese multinational firms drops by $56.1 billion, representing 12.6% of their 1997 
market value, thus providing evidence for the adverse effect of transfer pricing on multinational 
firms profitability.  In the next section, we will discuss the data and methodology of the study. 
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Our econometric analysis utilizes the gravity model (Leamer, 1994; Brenton et al., 1999; 
Gopinath, Munisamy, and Echeverria, Rodrigo, 2004; Brulhart and Kelly, 1999) widely used in 
the FDI and international trade theory.  The gravity model takes into account distant, language, 
and skills differences between the home and host country.  The slightly modified form of the 
gravity equation is taken the following form, 
𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽0𝑆𝑈𝑀𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑢𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐺 + +𝛽3𝐷𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑢𝑖𝑡 +
+ 𝛽4𝐷𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑢𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽5𝑇𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐺𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑇𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐺𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑢𝑖𝑡 +
+ 𝛽8𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑢𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐸𝑋𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡 +
+ 𝛽11𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡+𝛽12𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑢𝑖𝑡,  
   
Where 𝑖 indexes host country, 𝑡 is the year, and 𝑢 is the U.S.  The dependent variable 
(REINVEST) measures the volume of reinvestment earnings of U.S. based multinational firms in 
host country at time 𝑡.  The variables of interest transfer pricing regulation (𝑇𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐺) and the 
interaction term between differences in tax rates and regulations (𝐷𝑇𝐴𝑋 ∗ 𝑇𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐺) deserve 
some special attention.  As mentioned above, Section 482 of the U.S. tax code requires that (1) 
the transfer prices be set at arm’s length and (2) firms also are required to have contemporaneous 
documentation on their transfer pricing practices.  However, most countries that adopted transfer 
pricing regulation modeled after the U.S. section 482 seldom require contemporaneous 
documentation.   
Contemporaneous documentation requirements increase costs for multination firms since 
they need to allocate extra resources to comply with the requirements, i.e., have to hire more 
accountants, lawyers, etc. Therefore, it is assumed that transfer pricing regulation is tougher with 
documentation requirements than without.  It our analysis we will use two measurements for 
transfer pricing toughness in TPREG: (1) regulation is strong when having law in the tax codes 
regulating transfer pricing but without documentation requirements and (2) regulation is strong 
when having law in the tax codes that require both the arm-length principle and the 
contemporaneous documentation requirement.   
TPREG takes the value of 1 for the years when home country (U.S.) and host country 
have different level of regulation and a value of 0 for years when both countries have the same 
level of transfer pricing regulation.  The coefficient on TPREG is expected to be positive since a 
positive coefficient indicates that multinational firms invest more in host country with relatively 
weak transfer pricing regulations compared to the home country.  The coefficient on the 
interaction term between TPREG and DTAX is expected to be negative, i.e., relatively high 
corporate tax rate in host country discourages multinational firm’s investment even though it has 
a fairly weak transfer pricing policy compare to home country.   
The U.S. is the first major country to officially pass any transfer pricing regulation in its 
tax codes.  This creates a unique situation where the possibilities are: (1) home country have a 
relatively stronger transfer pricing regulation than host country, (2) home and host country both 
does not have any transfer pricing regulation, and finally (3) home and host country both has 
similar transfer pricing regulations in place.  Consequently, we can only test for the effect when 
home country has a relatively stronger transfer pricing law than host country but not the other 
way around.  Consequently, when both the home and host country have similar policy (either 
both have and do not have regulation) regarding transfer pricing then one should not expect this 
to effect multinational firms FDI decision.   
Horst (1971), Eden (1998), and Samuelson (1988) have shown that benefit of tax-
motivated transfer pricing manipulation for multinational firms is when the tax rate differential is 
large between the home and host country.  Therefore, one would expect the effect of transfer 
pricing regulation on FDI should be working in conjunction with the differences in tax rates 
between the home and host country.  Hence, Transfer pricing arbitrage exists when there are 
differences in transfer pricing regulation across home and host country and it increases in the 
same direction of tax rates differentials.  Appendix A1 provides the expected sign as well as 
detail justification of the independent variables. 
To construct the dependent variable (multinational firm FDI),  we utilize the reinvestment 
earnings abroad for U.S. based multinational firms given by the US Department of Commerce, 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) Survey of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad and the Balance 
of Payments Survey, available for most of the major countries from 1982 through 2009.  
Appendix A1 provides further details on reinvestment earnings data across countries and years in 
our sample.  It is worth to mention that the top five countries which have the highest mean 
reinvestment earnings throughout the periods are Canada, Netherlands, United Kingdoms, 
Ireland, and Luxembourg.  Second, the maximum amount of reinvestment earnings for the 
Netherlands, Ireland, Luxembourg, and Canada are higher relative to other countries in our 
sample. 
Appendix A3 provide details on when host country begin its implementation of transfer 
pricing regulation, as well as it has a tax treaty with the U.S.  As mentioned earlier almost all 
countries that currently have transfer pricing regulation adopted it after 1994, after the U.S. 
passed Section 482.  However, contemporaneous documentation requirements are seldom 
adopted.  The variables of interested transfer pricing regulation (TPREG) are taken from various 
sources from KPMG publications and also from the OECD organization database on country 
profiles.  Tax Treaty (TAXTREAT) is taken from the Internal Revenue Services (IRS) it takes 
the value of 1 for years in which the U.S. has a bilateral tax treaty with the host country and 0 
otherwise.  Column 2 of table Appendix 4 shows the year a country adopted some kind of 
regulation on transfer pricing in its tax codes and column 3 of Appendix 4 provides the year in 
which the country has a bilateral tax treaty with the United States.  The data show that the U.S. is 
the first country to imposed details transfer pricing regulation in its tax code and subsequently 
other countries follow suit.  Also note that most tax haven countries do not adopt any transfer 
pricing regulation, e.g., Bahamas, Hong Kong, Panama, and the United Arab Emirates.   
Besides our variables of interest on transfer pricing regulation we also employed several 
control variables commonly used in the gravity model similar to ours such as distant between the 
U.S. and the host country, and whether the host country official language is English.  The model 
also controls for home and host country market size, proxy with real GDP, population and GDP 
per Capita.  Studies have found evidence that short-run fluctuation in the bilateral currency 
exchange rate increased inward FDI (Grubert and Mutti, 1991; Swenson, 1994; Blonigen, 1997). 
The literature on FDI’s determinates suggests that the quality of the host country’s labor force 
plays an important role in multinational firms’ FDI decision (Markusen and Venables, 1999; 
Zhang and Markusen, 1999).  We use the population education level to proxy for the quality of 
human capital in the host country.   
Other control variables are tax rates and tax reforms in the U.S., both theoretical and 
empirical evidence has shown that higher taxes discourage inward FDI by multinational firms 
(De Mooij and Ederwveen, 2003; Grubert and Mutti, 1991).  For tax rates, we obtain top 
corporate tax rates by country and year from various publications provided by 
PriceWaterHouseCooper as well as the World Tax Database provided by the Ross School of 
Business, University of Michigan.  The World Tax Database has country tax data going back to 
1970 through 2003.  In 1986, the U.S. made significant reforms to its tax laws, resulted in 
significantly lower top corporate tax rates from 45 percent to 35 percent.  The dummy variable 
TAXCHANGE measures the U.S. tax reforms in 1986 and takes on a value of 1 for the year 
1986 and beyond.  Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics of those variables mentioned above.   
Note that the number of observations on these variables is not consistent due to missing 
data either by a particular year or there are no data available for a particular country for a given 
year.  Second, the coverage on education is limited.  Third, over the 27 years and across 
countries, transfer pricing regulation is adopted about 31% of the time and the average top 
corporate tax rate is 32%.   
 
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
EXCHANGERATE 1056 47.68 170.82 0.00 1401.44 
GDPGROWTH 1055 3.38 3.70 -18.96 17.75 
TAXRATE 985 33.23 12.12 0.00 61.80 
USTAXRATE 1064 36.96 4.34 34 46 
SUMGDP 1031 29.64 .46 28.76 30.60 
TRADEOPEN 1059 88.52 72.36 9.30 453.44 
GDPCAP 1031 17825.99 15539.96 201.45 117955.00 
POP 1056 86090.94 238935.40 219.48 1322674.00 
EDU 824 37.95 21.41 1.95 98.09 
TPREG 1064 0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00 
TAXTREAT 1064 0.43 0.49 0.00 1.00 
DIST 1064 8059.72 3677.07 548.39 16008.79 
EDU 824 37.95 21.41 1.95 98.09 
Noted that SUMGDP is in natural log  
 
            Our analysis begins with a relatively naïve estimation using Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) then proceeding to a more sophisticated model to correct for potential problems.  Table 2 
provides the OLS’s estimation results.  For the purpose of this analysis we only use transfer 
pricing regulation without the contemporaneous requirement to regress on REINVEST for 
demonstration purposes and in the subsequent analysis we will compare both types of regulations 
with and without contemporaneous requirement.  Column 1 and 2 of Table 2 provide estimates 
for the variables of interest without controls and in column 3 and 4 we control for country 
specific characteristics as well as controlling for the U.S. tax reforms in 1986 and bilateral tax 
treaty between the U.S. and host country.  At first glance, transfer pricing regulation seems to 
have an effect on multinational firms’ reinvestment earnings but only through the interaction 
term with the differences in tax rates between the U.S. and host country.  The coefficient on 
TPREG is not significant but the coefficient on the interaction term is significant (p < 0.05) but 
does not take on the expected sign.   
          Difference in the tax rates is negative and significant (p < 0.05).  Based on the sign of the 
coefficients DTAX and DTAX2 then relatively high corporate income tax in the host country 
decreases reinvestments by U.S. based multinational firms but at a decreasing rate.  Both the 
coefficients on TAXCHANGE and TAXTREAT take on the correct sign and significant (p 
<0.05).  U.S. based multinational firms on average, repatriate 0.16 percent of income back to the 
U.S. after the tax reforms in 1986 which reduces top corporate income tax to 36%.  The 
coefficients on other control variables such as GDP, distance, common language, exchange rate, 
and trade openness does take on the correct sign and are significant (p < 0.05).  
 
 
Table 2 Estimates of Transfer Pricing regulation effects on U.S. MNE’s Reinvest Earnings abroad 
using OLS. 













Variables         
 
TPREG 0.47*** 0.46*** 0.19 0.01 -0.13 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.10) (0.11) 
TPREG*DTAX  0.03*** 0.03** 0.03*** 0.05*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Control Variables      
DTAX  -0.04*** -0.03*** -0.05*** -0.04*** 
  (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
DTAX2  -0.01*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
TAXCHANGE   0.97*** -0.16 -0.23 
   (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
TAXTREAT   0.43*** -0.61*** -0.34*** 
   (0.12) (0.10) (0.11) 
SUMGDP    1.26*** 1.16*** 
    (0.17) (0.21) 
DIST    -0.00*** -0.00*** 
    (0.00) (0.00) 
COMLANG    1.09*** 0.97*** 
    (0.11) (0.12) 
EXCHANGERATE    -0.03* -0.03 
    (0.02) (0.12) 
POP    0.41*** 0.64*** 
    (0.04) (0.05) 
GDPCAP    0.68*** 0.85*** 
    (0.06) (0.06) 
TRADEOPEN    0.01*** 0.01*** 
    (0.00) (0.01) 
EDU     0.01*** 
     (0.00) 
CONSTANT 6.04*** 6.20*** 5.21*** -30.74*** -41.27*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.15) (4.24) (5.61) 
      
Observations 885 985 830 795 630 
R-squared 0.02 0.06 0.12 0.49 0.57 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05.  SUMGDP, POP, GDPCAP are in log form  
expressed in natural log in the regression.  
However, we should be careful drawing conclusions from these estimates since it is 
difficult to make causal claims on the effect of transfer pricing regulation on FDI since a positive 
correlation also suggests that multinational firm who has high reinvestment earnings in a 
particular host country may be due to other unobserved factors.  A reasonable way to control for 
the unobserved characteristics is by run the model using the panel-data random effects 
specification.  Random effects specification is consistent and efficient compared to the fixed 
effects specification and allows for time invariant independent variables, e.g., distance and 
common language.  The Hausman-Wu test confirms the random effects specification over fixed 
effects specification in our data (𝜒2(12) = 5.87).   
         Table 3 presents results using random effects specification.  Column 1 and 3 illustrates the 
results when transfer pricing regulation is defined as having law in the tax codes requires the 
arm-length principle but without the contemporaneous documents requirement.  While column 2 
and 4 provides results with the same analysis procedure, but strong transfer pricing regulation is 
measured as requires both the arm-length principle and the contemporaneous document 
requirement.    
When regressing reinvestment earnings on transfer pricing regulation with no additional 
controls other than tax rates, the coefficients are significant (p < 0.05) and take on the correct 
expected sign as shown in column (1) and (2).  It is interesting to note that the magnitude of the 
effect of transfer price regulation is different depending on how transfer pricing regulation is 
defined.  The effect is larger when regulation requires contemporaneous documents requirement 
compared to when it does not and the difference is significant at the 95% level.  The results in 
column (2) show that on average, host country with fairly weak transfer pricing regulations 
attracts 0.48% of reinvestment earnings from U.S. based multinational firms and this effect is 
greater when the host country also has a low corporate income tax rate.  However, once we 
control for home and host country specific characteristics the effect of transfer pricing regulation 
disappeared.  Based on the result, transfer pricing regulation heterogeneity does not affect 
foreign direct investment by multinational firms.   Both coefficients, TPREG and its interaction 
term are not significant at the 95% significant level as shown in column (3) and (4).   
Most of the control variables in the regression do take on the correct sign and 
significance (p < 0.05) except for exchange rate, tax treaty and U.S. tax reforms.  The coefficient 
on tax rates is negative and significant (p < 0.01).  As expected host country with high corporate 
income tax deters investment from U.S. based multinationals but at a decreasing rate (DTAX2 is 
negative and significant (p < 0.01)).  On the other hand, host country with a large market size, 
high level of trade openness, having a common language with the U.S., and relatively close to 
the U.S. are attractive by U.S. based multinational firms. 
Table 3 Estimates of Transfer Pricing regulation effects on U.S. MNE’s Reinvest 
Earnings abroad using random effects specification. 














 Interested Variables         
TPREG 0.30*** 0.48*** -0.08 -0.14 
 (0.10) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) 
TPREG*DTAX -0.01 -0.03*** 0.01 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Control Variables     
DTAX -0.06*** -0.04*** -0.02*** -0.02*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
DTAX2 -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
TAXCHANGE   -0.20* -0.20* 
   (0.12) (0.12) 
TAXTREAT   0.06 0.08 
   (0.11) (0.11) 
SUMGDP   0.68*** 0.73*** 
   (0.19) (0.20) 
DIST   -0.00*** -0.00*** 
   (0.00) (0.00) 
COMLANG   0.89*** 0.87** 
   (0.35) (0.37) 
EXCHANGERATE   0.01 0.01 
   (0.02) (0.02) 
POP   0.60*** 0.59*** 
   (0.11) (0.11) 
GDPCAP   0.80*** 0.79*** 
   (0.12) (0.12) 
TRADEOPEN   0.01*** 0.01*** 
   (0.00) (0.00) 
EDU   -0.01 -0.01 
   (0.00) (0.00) 
CONSTANT 6.05*** 5.95*** -26.80*** -28.26*** 
 (0.21) (0.21) (4.27) (4.40) 
     
Observations 830 830 630 630 
R-Squared 0.04 0.04 0.53 0.53 
Number of country 38 38 37 37 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05.  Noted that SUMGDP, POP, 
GDPCAP are expressed in natural log in the regression. 
 
CONCLUSION 
We start the chapter with the hypothesis that differences in transfer pricing regulations 
between the home and host country affect multinational firm’s FDI decision. Particularly, host 
country with no transfer pricing law would attract investments from multinational firms.  As 
Transfer pricing regulations limited multinational firms from taking advantage of differences in 
tax rates between different tax jurisdictions. Additionally, one would expect the effect of transfer 
pricing regulation on FDI should be working in conjunction with the differences in tax rates 
between the home and host country.  Hence, transfer pricing arbitrage exists when there are 
differences in transfer pricing regulation across home and host country and it increases in the 
same direction of tax rates differentials.   
Using data on U.S. based multinational firms’ reinvestment earnings abroad as a proxy 
for FDI activity, provided by the BEA Survey of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad and the Balance 
of Payments Survey we analyze the effect of transfer pricing regulation of multination firm 
FDI’s decision.  Using the gravity model with random effects we found no empirical evidence 
that heterogeneity in transfer pricing regulation among home and host country affect FDI activity 
by U.S. based multinational firms.  Host country’s specific characteristics such as market size, 
distant from the U.S., trade openness, as well as tax rates seem to be the primarily determinants 
of FDI activity.     
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TPREG + Relatively Weak transfer pricing laws in host country 
encourage FDI from multinational firms. 
TPREG*DTAX - We should expect a larger investment in host country by 
multinational when host country has a relatively lower tax rate 
and a weak transfer pricing laws compare to the home country. 
TAXTREAT - Bilateral tax treaty between the U.S. and host country reduces 
tax avoidance by multinationals thus reduces incentive for 
multinational firms to invest in host country. 
TAXRATE - Higher tax rate in host country deters multinational firms to 
invest. 
SUMGDP + Strong GDP promotes FDI from multinational firms. 
GDPCAP + High GDP per Capita promotes FDI from multinational firms. 
DIST - The further the distant between the home and host country 
discourages FDI investment because of transportation cost and 
control. 
COMLANG + Having a common language in the host country make it easier 
to do business thus encourages FDI by multinational firms. 
EXCHANGERATE - Production costs increase when host country currency 
appreciates against the home country currency. 
TRADEOPEN + Proxy for host country trade openness, less restriction on 
trades and transfers should promote FDI from multinational 
firms. 
POP + As a proxy for market size, host country with a large market 
size is attractive for multinational firms to invest. 
EDU + Studies have shown that high skill labors in host country 
attract FDI investment. 
Notes:  The variables SUMGDP, GDPCAP, DIST, EXCHANGERATE and POP are express in natural 
log in the regression. 
 
A2. Reinvest Earnings by U.S. Multinationals by Country 
Country 
Number of 
Years Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Australia 28 1374.00 1410.80 -446.00 5107.00 
Austria 28 -18.89 1744.50 -8473.00 2074.00 
Bahamas 17 -234.59 459.76 -1401.00 529.00 
Belgium 28 1033.36 862.76 176.00 3511.00 
Brazil 28 1308.89 1623.65 -1509.00 4278.00 
Canada 28 5903.07 5065.23 -36.00 17619.00 
Chile 28 657.86 1211.43 -183.00 5403.00 
China 28 825.11 1299.82 -92.00 4712.00 
Denmark 28 174.29 250.94 -160.00 935.00 
Finland 28 114.71 112.48 -49.00 331.00 
France 28 1082.21 1220.35 -612.00 4651.00 
Germany 28 1719.04 1791.30 -455.00 6676.00 
Hong Kong 28 1511.14 1530.18 -396.00 4768.00 
Hungary 11 509.18 486.55 -117.00 1423.00 
India 28 355.07 605.67 -182.00 2030.00 
Ireland 28 3650.96 5723.53 -3257.00 22582.00 
Israel 28 231.36 188.17 24.00 750.00 
Italy 28 825.43 695.23 -746.00 2476.00 
Japan 28 2302.79 2559.19 -392.00 7677.00 
Korea: Republic of 27 778.93 876.83 -14.00 2821.00 
Luxembourg 28 3116.43 6019.47 -5953.00 17395.00 
Mexico 28 2442.93 2414.82 -363.00 7640.00 
Netherlands 28 8204.82 14688.08 
-
33848.00 45889.00 
New Zealand 28 131.43 175.07 -163.00 476.00 
Norway 28 198.93 775.81 -2813.00 1865.00 
Panama 28 417.86 441.79 -501.00 2020.00 
Philippines 28 172.04 187.43 -86.00 640.00 
Poland 11 419.00 407.86 11.00 1122.00 
Portugal 28 92.50 123.83 -322.00 432.00 
Singapore 28 2051.82 3077.20 -4637.00 11770.00 
South Africa 28 157.25 205.52 -117.00 816.00 
Spain 28 924.18 1322.87 -424.00 5699.00 
Sweden 27 231.81 615.84 -2174.00 1303.00 
Switzerland 28 3656.36 4795.43 -7366.00 14875.00 
Taiwan 28 492.07 408.63 36.00 1602.00 
Turkey 28 119.25 180.70 -137.00 689.00 
United Arab 
Emirates 28 62.25 217.81 -944.00 353.00 
United Kingdom 28 4118.61 5107.31 -1195.00 17620.00 












Bilateral Tax Treaty 
Year 
      Australia 1997 1996 1982 
      Austria 1995 N/A 1996 
      Bahamas N/A N/A N/A 
      Belgium 1999 N/A 2006 
      Bermuda N/A N/A N/A 
      Brazil 1997 N/A N/A 
      Canada 1995 1999 1980 
      Chile 1997 N/A N/A 
      China 2007 2009 1984 
      Denmark 1998 N/A 2000 
      Finland 2006 N/A 1989 
      France 1999 1996 1994 
      Germany 2005 2004 1989 
      Hong Kong N/A N/A N/A 
      Hungary 1996 2005 1979 
      India 2001 2002 1989 
      Ireland 1997 N/A 1997 
      Israel 2006 2005 1975 
      Italy 2010 N/A 1999 
      Japan 1996 N/A 2003 
      Korea 1996 1999 N/A 
      Luxembourg 2010 N/A 2001 
      Malaysia 2003 2005 N/A 
      Mexico 1995 1998 1992 
      Netherlands 2001 2002 1992 
      New Zealand 2001 2001 1982 
      Norway 2008 2005 N/A 
      Panama N/A N/A N/A 
      Poland 1997 2003 1994 
      Portugal 2001 N/A 1994 
      Philippines 1995 N/A N/A 
      Singapore 2006 2005 N/A 
      South Africa 1999 N/A N/A 
      Spain 2006 2005 1990 
      Sweden 2007 2005 1994 
      Switzerland 1997 N/A 1996 
      Taiwan 2004 2005 N/A 
      Turkey 2007 N/A 1996 














A4 Variables Definition and Sources 
Variables Definition SOURCES 
EXCHANGERATE 
Currency exchange rate between U.S. 
dollars and a particular country 
currency 
United Nations’ UNCTAD 
Statistics database 
GDPGROWTH Real GDP growth rate UNCTAD Statistics database 
TPREG 
Take a value of ‘1’ for when the U.S. 
has transfer pricing regulation and host 
country does and 0 otherwise.   
KPMG and OECD’s reports on 
transfer pricing across countries. 
TAXRATE 
Differences in top corporate tax rates 
between the U.S. and host countries 
World Tax Database provided by 
UMICH Business School and 
Price Waterhouse’s publication. 
GDPCAP GDP per capita 
World Bank Development 
Indicators 
GDP Gross Domestic Product (in billions) 
World Bank Development 
Indicators 
POP Country's population in thousand  
World Bank Development 
Indicators 
EDU 
Measure country’s human capital proxy 
by the percent enrollment beyond 
secondary schools 
World Bank Development 
Indicators 
TAXTREAT 
Taken a value of ‘1’ for years which the 
country has a bilateral tax treaty with 
the U.S. and ‘0’ for years when the two 
countries do not have any tax treaty. 
U.S. internal Revenue Services 
TRADEOPEN 
Measure country level of trade 
openness in 2005 prices 
Penn World Table 2010 
DIST 
Distant in miles between the U.S. and 
host country (measures between the 
two country capitals) 
The French Center for Research 
and Studies on  the World 
Economy (CEPII) database on 
geodesic distance 
COMLANG 
Takes the value of ‘1’ when host 
country official language is English and 
0 otherwise 
The French Center for Research 
and Studies on  the World 
Economy (CEPII) database on 
geodesic distance 
 
